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“A government should not be called upon to defend its regulation of advertising in a
court of human rights...”1
“At bottom, the Enron and WorldCom cases are about false advertising.”2
“[T]here is no use trying to find villains, because the problem is in the structure of the
situation.”3

If you open a newspaper in the United States these days it is difficult to escape the
fallout from the last decade of corporate excesses. WorldCom. Enron. Arthur Andersen.
Tyco. American International Group.4 Citibank agreed to pay a $2 billion dollar
settlement in relation to its role in the Enron fiasco.5 As large as that amount seems, it
may have gotten away with a bargain since, according to some observers, Citibank’s
exposure could have been even greater than $2 billion.6 Other firms, Chase, Merrill
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Lynch have yet to settle (or will probably have settled by the time this goes to press).7
Ebbers, Kozlowski, Rigas and Quattrone have been convicted, and the trials of top Enron
executives, Ken Lay, Jeffrey Skilling and Richard Causey are still ahead.8 Furthermore,
largely in response to spectacular failures like Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) law was
passed in 20029 as an attempt to tighten up corporate responsibility and accountability.
Yet, for many reasons, real accountability has been elusive. First, the legal
structure of a corporation most often shields the flesh and blood actors in the corporation
– shareholders, officers and directors, executives – from personal liability.10 And, in
those circumstances where an exception would apply and liability could theoretically
attach, corporate officers, directors and managers act within a collectivity11 that diffuses
both knowledge and responsibility such that no one person may really possess the sort of
guilty knowledge that serves in many minds as a prerequisite for liability.12 Undoubtedly
many of those few who did find themselves convicted could say, along with former
WorldCom, Inc accountant, Betty Vinson, “I never expected to be here.”13 Thus,
ultimately, it has been difficult to satisfactorily hold anyone to account in way that offers
any comfort that the future will be fundamentally different from the past.14 Citibank’s $2
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billion dollar settlement isn’t nothing, but it isn’t certain just how large the settlement
would have to be to discourage future officers and directors from ever engaging in similar
conduct.15 Put another way, it isn’t possible to know whether Citigroup has been
“punished” without knowing how much money it made on these transactions with Enron.
If it made a $20 billion profit for example, a $2 billion reduction in that profit still leaves
a healthy $18 billion profit. That number, and the question of whether any profit at all is
left after all the associated costs of the Enron collapse are factored in, is pure speculation.
And while we cannot assume that the specter of criminal sanctions or public relations
scandals have no effect on deterring undesirable, it still seems that the primary motivating
factor in decision-making is whether the action will be profitable.
Nevertheless, the question illustrates one of the principal difficulties with
regulating corporate conduct – including speech: “For a corporation, compliance with
law, like everything else, is a matter of costs and benefits.”16 If the benefits outweigh the
costs Citigroup presumably will do again what it did with Enron. In fact, according to
some, it may have a duty to shareholders to do so.17 And the evidence suggests that
while the past 10 years have included more spectacular corporate misconduct, the
existence of corporate law breaking in pursuit of profit is not only not anomalous, it is
endemic.18 The catalog of ways in which corporate misconduct has contributed to social
ills, such as environmental pollution, harmful products, lost pensions, and so forth, seems
sufficiently manifest as to cut off the question of whether there is a problem. The
question rather is what to do about it.
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While many observers focus on ethical issues, recalibrating executive
compensation, or the possibility of changes to corporate structure and to accounting rules
for the prevention of future “Enrons,”19 far too little attention has been paid to a key
factor making Enron possible – the nature of corporate communication. Enron’s
management systematically failed to communicate important facts that investors,
employees and the public might want to know, while simultaneously flooding the market
with ersatz “information” designed to package, promote and “sell” the public on its own
version of the corporation’s worth.20 It could do this because of a legal environment in
which duties to disclose are sometimes ambiguous and may be laxly enforced (even in
the absence of an intent to deceive), while there is a virtually unbridled freedom for
corporate speech that takes the form of marketing and public relations.
In other words communication, or the lack thereof, is a key factor in both the
development of Enron-like disasters and in their prevention. New York Times media
columnist Frank Rich claims that it was public relations propaganda that propped up
Enron’s “house of cards.”21 It is difficult to understand how else to explain how the
company managed to succeed in selling itself to investors, the financial media and the
public at large when there was so little in the way of hard factual support for its claims of
profits.22 But it seems that facts and empirical support were not very significant to
investors or the media. And there is little evidence of a change in the media climate.
Instead, “spin,” how it plays, the spectacle, 23 is all-important in influencing behavior of

RAPOPORT & DHARAN, ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS, supra note 2 (collected essays dissecting what
happened and some proposed remedies).
20
Id. Jeffrey D. Van Niel & Nancy B. Rapoport, Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Skilling: How Enron’s Public Image
Morphed from the Most Innovative Company in the Fortune 500 to the Most Notorious Company Ever, in
RAPOPORT & DHARAN, ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS (describing public relations success) and Frank
Rich, Enron: Patron Saint of Bush’s Fake News, THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 20, 2005. (detailing some
of the P.R. exercises that created the image that Rapoport and Van Niel describe).
21
Id. One example of such P.R. efforts was a tour Enron executives gave financial analysts of Enron’s
newly launched EES division in 1998. The analysts were taken to the 6th floor in Enron’s headquarters.
There, they beheld the very picture of a sophisticated, booming business: a big open
room, bustling with people, all busily working the telephones and hunched over computer
terminals, seemingly cutting deals and trading energy. Giant plasma screens displayed electronic
maps, which could show the sites of EES’s many contracts and prospects. Commodity priced
danced across an electronic ticker. “IT was very impressive, “recalls analyst John Olson, who at
the time, covered the company for Merrill Lynch. “It was a veritable beehive of activity.”
It was also a veritable sham. The war room had been rapidly fitted out explicitly to
impress the analysts.
BETHANY MCLEAN AND PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM, (Portfolio, Penguin
Group, 2003) at 179-80.
22
Enron’s continuing to post profits despite being unable to show how it generated them, and in spite of a
refusal to offer balance sheets and cash flow statements led some observers to refer to it as a “black box.”
MCLEAN AND ELKIND, supra note 21at 320-321.
23
How else to explain the apparent widespread apathy or collective shrug of the shoulders at the gradual
revelation that Iraq apparently had no weapons of mass destruction?
19

4

all kinds – consumer, political,24 personal – and all of these behaviors are heavily
influenced by massive “speech” efforts on the part of corporate speakers.25
According to Judge Richard Posner, news itself is a commodity like everything
else. “Being profit-driven, the media respond to actual demands of their audience rather
that to the idealized ‘thirst’ for knowledge’ demand posited by public intellectuals and
deans of journalism schools.”26 However, he theorizes that fortunately for those who are
interested in the truth there is nevertheless, “a market demand for correcting the errors
and ferreting out the misdeeds of one’s enemies...”27 Alas, for Enron’s stockholders,
creditors and other investors, these motives apparently didn’t arise soon enough.28 Nor
are they likely to in the future with respect to any future “Enrons.” This is because very
often there is no “enemy” for a company in which everything seems to be going well, at
least judging by stock prices.29 In addition, the news media have become so dependent
upon the corporations themselves for the information about companies that too often their
reporters rely exclusively on information from the companies themselves, rather than on
independent newsgathering. Such information is supplied largely in the form of press
releases, web postings, press conferences, and other public relations tools. And most of
the content of that is unregulated.
Since the 1970s governmental regulation of advertising in the United States has
come under increasing scrutiny as a burden on “speech” or freedom of expression.30
While it is difficult to identify the cause, during that same period corporations have
pressed for and increasingly obtained, greater roles in politics in the form of contribution
to candidates or causes,31 the formation of political action committees or other groups to
24
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lobby on their behalf,32 and proposing legislation designed to address their interests.33 A
key component on which this trend has been built is the identification of the corporation
as a “person”34 – a person with rights to freedom of expression.35
This trend, to push for corporate rights paralleling those of human beings, is not
one limited to the United States. The same trend can be observed in Canada and
Europe.36 Thus, corporations have, among other tactics, claimed that some restrictions on
advertising are violations of the right of freedom of expression set forth in Article 10 of
See, e.g., JOHN C. STAUBER AND SHELDON RAMPTON, TOXIC SLUDGE IS GOOD FOR YOU!, (Common
Courage Press, Monroe, MA, U.S.A., 1995) (describing influence of public relations lobbying, primarily,
but not exclusively, on behalf of business interests). For a similar thesis which has a Canadian focus and
which was conducted a almost a decade earlier see JOYCE NELSON, SULTANS OF SLEAZE: PUBLIC
RELATIONS AND MEDIA, (Between the Lines, Toronto, Canada 1989).
33
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and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, DAVID KAIRYS, Ed., (Pantheon, New York 1982) at 256. For
an excellent discussion of the history of the development of corporate theory as well as an argument that
what Justice Field meant by corporate personhood in 1886 is significantly different from the natural entity
theory that later developed see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW:
1870-1960 at 65-107 (Chapt. 3, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory). See also
KLEIN AND COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE, supra note 14 at 112-117 (discussing
development of current doctrine); TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA, (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, San
Francisco, CA, 2003) (describing rise of corporate power).
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See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575) (Nike arguing
that a lawsuit by a California activist charging that Nike had issued false statements in its press releases
infringed on its first amendment rights); Brief of Exxonmobil, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley and
Glaxosmithkline as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 2003 WL 835523 at *2
(“Nike’s speech and speech by corporations on other matter of public concern merit the highest level of
First Amendment protection.”). One might expect such positions from commercial entities. More
surprising were the statements of support from organizations like the ACLU and the Thomas Jefferson
Center for the Protection of Freedom of Expression. Both entities filed briefs in support of the notion that
freedom for corporate speech was an essential component of freedom of speech for all. See 2003 WL
1192678, Amici Curiae Brief of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the protection of Free Expression and the
Media Institute (Feb. 28, 2005) and 2003 WL 721563, Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties
Union and the ACLU of Northern California in Support of Petitioner (Feb. 24, 2003).
36
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commercial expression in Canada and Europe respectively).
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the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.37 Given
that some European countries have regulations which are significantly more restrictive of
advertising than U.S. law,38 it is clear that the adoption of a theory that corporations have
speech rights completely analogous to those of persons will pose a threat to the continued
viability of those regulatory efforts, particularly as the notion that human rights require
explicit and vigorous protection gains ground. But “human rights” may represent a
Trojan horse through which corporations obtain a legal argument that acts as a shield
against all manner of governmental regulation.
Less well examined (although not by any means unexamined)39 is the question:
Why should corporations have “human rights”? Arguably they should not. But once the
corporation was identified as a person for some purposes, the parallels apparently became
irresistible to some and the rational basis for distinguishing between natural and fictitious
persons (it appears) harder to summon up. This trend is one with enormous rhetorical
power. By claiming expressive rights, corporations tap into cherished notions of
autonomy, freedom and fairness.40 And it is a fraud. As Professor Shiner of the
University of Alberta puts it:
37

See, e.g., Notice for the OJ 11, Sept. 2003 by Kreuzer Medien GmbH against the European Parliament
and the Council for the European Union challenging the regulation of tobacco products as “infring[ing]” on
“the freedom of expression safeguarded by Article 11 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the european
union and Article 1091) of the ECHR.” So far, to this author’s knowledge, such attempts to limit the
regulation of products causing health risks have been rebuffed, see, e.g., Decision of the Court of
Arbitration of Belgium, 102/99, 30 September 1999 (banning advertising for tobacco products not at
variance with freedom of expression), Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, 15 June 2000, Case C376/98 Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament and Council of Europe and Case C-74/99 The
Queen V. Secretary of State for Health and Other, ex parte Imperial Tobacco Ltd. and others, “I conclude,
therefore, that the Advertising Directive does not constitute a disproportionate restriction of freedom of
expression in so far as it imposes a comprehensive prohibition on the advertising of tobacco products.”
¶175. Although I recognize that the effect of these decisions and their applicability is ambiguous, see
Benjamin Apt, On the Right to Freedom of Expression in the European Union, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 69,
86-87 (1998) (“The legal status of the Convention in the EU has [ ] been perpetually ambiguous.”), such
decisions are instructive because they shape perceptions.
38
For example, Sweden prohibits ads targeting children under the age of 12. LORD CAMPBELL OF
ALLOWAY, Q.C. & ZAHD YAQUB, THE EUROPEAN HANDBOOK ON ADVERTISING LAW (Cavendish
Publishing, Ltd., London, U.K., 1999) at 789 (Ch. 6, s 1 of the Radio and Television Act, 1996)(Radio-och
TV-lagen 1996:844)(“advertising must not be targeted at children below the age of 12...”). And British
regulators recently “introduced new rules barring depictions of links between sex and drinking in alcohol
advertisements.” Eric Pfanner, No Hunks in the Alcohol Advertisements, Please, We’re British, THE NEW
YORK TIMES C4, (Aug. 1, 2005).
39
Many of the arguments and objections I advance here, or some version thereof, have been forcefully set
out by others, most notably by professors Daniel Greenwood, Roger Shiner, Joel Bakan, and C. Edwin
Baker. See Greenwood, Essential Speech, supra note 11; SHINER, FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL
EXPRESSION, supra note 1; BAKAN, THE CORPORATION, supra note 15; C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism,
Politics, and Citizen Freedom: the Commercial Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE WES. RES. L. REV.
1161 (2204); C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS, (Princeton University Press,
Princeton, N.J. 1994).
40
Although it is worthwhile to take extravagant statements about the deep commitment to freedom of
speech with a grain of salt given that there is very little of such freedom in the workplace, that is, if one
wants to keep his job. And work is where a number of citizens spend most of their waking hours. An
analysis of the way in which employers are able to punish speech with which they disagree suggests that as
a society, or at least in law, deference to property mostly trumps deference to freedom of speech. See, e.g.,
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Behind the respect traditionally given in liberal democratic thought to freedom of
expression as an ideal lies an attractive picture of human beings as autonomous
choosers, and of human flourishing as relying on freely chosen sociality. The
corporate domination of both the real market and the market-place of ideas
defaces this attractive picture. The predatory attempt by corporations to
appropriate the picture in order to justify constitutional protection for the
contribution made by corporate expression to that domination needs to be exposed
as the conceptual and normative fraud that it is.41
Alas, there are few signs that the trend to treat corporations as “persons” with
expressive rights is slowing. If anything, it appears to have gained ground. In the U.S.
the recent Nike case resulted in an opinion that, while not ruling in Nike’s favor because
of jurisdictional issues, nevertheless suggested that a majority of the Supreme Court
seemed to think that fairness and equal time for all viewpoints required that Nike’s
“viewpoint” be given constitutional protection, lest its communication be unduly
“chilled.”42 Completed elided by this argument is the fact that Nike’s views are largely
organized around the corporate necessity of profit, a single-mindedness of purpose that

Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L. J. 101 (1995); Richard
Michael Fischl, Labor, Management, and the First Amendment: Whose Rights Are These, Anyway?, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 729 (1989). Moreover, there is some evidence that the whistleblower protection
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley have proven particularly effective.
Three years ago, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law and hailed as a safety net for
employees who stepped forward and revealed wrongdoing at their companies. But of the
hundreds of people who lost jobs and filed complaints since the act was passed, only two are
actually back at their jobs.
Jayne O’Donnell, Blowing the whistle can lead to harsh aftermath, despite law, USA TODAY, August 1,
2005 at 1B.
41
SHINER, supra note 1at 3.
42
The Stevens opinion concurring in the dismissal, which was joined by Ginsburg and Souter in the
relevant part, reflects a concern for the potential “chilling effect” if Kasky’s lawsuit was able to proceed, a
concern that presumes that corporations offer valuable input in this context and that overlooks the
significance of the demurrer. See Nike Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 123 S.Ct. 2554, 2558-59 (Stevens, J.
concurring). Kennedy dissented without opinion, but in an earlier opinion he suggested, and was joined in
this opinion by Justice Scalia, that, in his view, the Central Hudson test was insufficiently protective of
“truthful, nonmisleading speech.” He didn’t say how it was insufficiently protected, but it is a statement
suggesting more rather than less protection for commercial speech. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001)(Kennedy, J concurring). Justice Breyer wrote a dissent from the decision to
dismiss, thus indicating he would have preferred to decide the Nike case. And his opinion, joined by
Justice O’Connor, left little doubt about what he thought of Nike’s argument. He appeared to agree that
allowing Kasky’s lawsuit to proceed would generate a “chilling effect” on future speech. Nike, Inc. v.
Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 123 S.Ct. 2554, 2568 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas has straightforwardly
announced his support for treating advertising speech like political speech in earlier opinions. See, e.g.,
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring)(“I would subject all of
the advertising restrictions to strict scrutiny and would hold that they violate the First Amendment.”). By
my count, this suggests that a majority of the Court is receptive, at least in part, to arguments such as Nike
advanced. Note that even if the members of the Court agreed in principle that false speech was not
protected by the First Amendment, the procedural structure would virtually guarantee no meaningful
restriction on false speech. For different analysis of this case see David C. Vladeck, Lessons From A Story
Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE WES.RES. L. REV. 1049 (2004).
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(perhaps thankfully) natural persons rarely possess.43 And its resources are such that only
the willfully blind could claim that Nike had not had an opportunity to air its views.44
According to Kasky, the plaintiff in that case, the problem was that Nike had aired its
“views” far too widely and thereby intentionally misled consumers, investors and the
general public as to its labor and manufacturing practices.
What was at issue in the Nike case was whether Nike could be held liable if its
statements concerning its labor practices were false. What it wanted was the ability to
say whatever it deemed in its best interest without any liability should some of its
statements later be deemed false, even if the false statements were made knowing that
they were false, with the erection of a constitutional shield from costs, imposed by fines,
judgments and the other impedimenta of governmental regulation associated with untrue
claims.45 But a key issue in the Enron and WorldCom fiascos, and many others of the
corporate rogues’ gallery, involved whether these organizations, or rather, the people
speaking on their behalf, told the truth – whether they disclosed what needed to be
disclosed or had said something that was intended to mislead investors or others who
might be expected to rely on their statements. If Nike had gotten what it wanted, a
constitutional shield for such statements, would Sarbanes-Oxley matter?46 Or would a
constitutional defense be available which would trump any legislative intervention?
Although the proponents of freedom for commercial expression claim that such
protection is needed because without it the debate will be unbalanced because one
speaker is unduly chilled, one need not look much farther than the infamous “McLibel”
case in the U.K. to see what is wrong with this argument.47 In this case McDonald’s sued
two impecunious members of London Greenpeace for libel on the basis of their
distribution of leaflets that protested a number of McDonald’s business practices,
primarily on environmental, labor and nutritional issues. The lawsuit came at the end of
43

“Unlike groups of citizens, who must always debate the proper and shifting balance of conflicting values,
corporations will pursue a single value to the detriment of all others.” Greenwood, Essential Speech, supra
note 11 at 1051. “There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.” Hansmann and Kraakman, The End of History
for Corporate Law, supra note 17, 89 GEORGETOWN L.J. at 439. For a critique of the notion that this state
of affairs is unproblematic because a broader than ever class of persons own stock, primarily through
pension funds, see Paddy Ireland, Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth, 68 THE MODERN
L. REV. 49 (2005). This is also to some extent an oversimplification. See infra note 63 and accompanying
text. See also EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: A STUDY OF THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF
WEALTH IN AMERICA (2002).
44
For example, in the Nike suit, the plaintiff Kasky alleged that in 1997 Nike spent “almost $1 billion”
dollars on advertising and promotion. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., Amended Complaint at 5, Case No. 994446 (Jul
2, 1998).
45
I have analyzed this aspect of Nike’s claim in some detail in an earlier piece. Tamara R. Piety,
Grounding Nike: Exposing Nike’s Quest for a Constitutional Right to Lie, 78 TEMPLE L. REV. 151 (2005).
46
Some observers have argued that Sarbanes-Oxley is mostly not responsive to fixing the problems that led
to the Enron fiasco and that many of its provisions are likely to do little to advance the goal of greater
corporate responsibility. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
47
See http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/index.html. A feature length documentary was recently released
about the case. See http://www.spannerfilms.net/?lid=161 “McLibel: The Postman and the Gardner Who
Took on McDonald’s” (last visited on Aug. 27, 2005).
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a period of several months during which McDonald’s hired private investigators to
infiltrate London Greenpeace’s meetings.48 At the conclusion of this period of
surveillance, McDonald’s sued five members of the group and extracted apologies and
retractions from them with the threat of libel liability49 – from all that is but Helen Steel
and David Morris. They refused to apologize and so McDonald’s sued. Steel and Morris
were too poor to hire legal representation and were clearly not economic competitors,50
yet McDonalds saw fit to launch what became the longest trial in English history51 in
order to “stop people telling lies.”52 Because of the single-mindedness of corporate
purpose, profit, corporations’ management is most interested in freedom of expression
(particularly freedom from liability) for the corporations’ speech. They are less keen to
extend the freedom of expression to others – even when those others offer very little
commercial threat and appear to be engaged in quintessential political speech activities.53
Still, perhaps it might be said that McDonald’s was acting in this case no
differently than a natural person might. As Thomas Emerson noted, “It has been
common for individuals and groups who demanded freedom of expression for themselves
to insist that it be denied to others.”54 Although it might be argued that disparity in
resources and abilities to project one’s message are just a necessary corollary of freedom,
this argument focuses too much on the way corporate “persons” might be said to
resemble natural persons and glosses over their very significant structural and moral
differences from natural persons, differences that suggest that corporate entities neither
need, nor should be granted the sorts of liberal speech rights that are (theoretically) the
birthright of natural persons. In this essay I review some of those differences and argue
that both in theory and in practice it is not only permissible to differentiate between
natural and “legal” persons but necessary to do so in order to retain even a modicum of
governmental impact on important social goals.
48

See http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/trial/story.html (last visited on Aug. 27, 2005).
McDonald’s had earlier extracted apologies and retractions from some media organizations which had
reproduced the leaflet or discussed the claims. Id.
50
Id.
51
“McLibel” pair win legal case: Two activists should have been given legal aid in their long fight against
a McDonald’s libel action, a court says, BBC NEWS UK EDITION, Feb. 15, 2005.
52
Statement distributed by McDonald’s Restaurants, Ltd. via leaflets in McDonald’s restaurants in
London in April and May of 1994, explaining why it was suing Steel and Morris. Available at
http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/pretrial/factsheet_ reply.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
53
Lest anyone think that the McLibel case represented an anomaly because of the relative strictness of
English libel law and that corporations would not think to launch similar suppression efforts in the United
States, one has only to look at the Fox case brought against comedian Al Franken. See infra note 149. That
case was quickly dismissed. Id. Yet it is an indication both of the incentive structure, that is, what will be
attempted if possible, and of which way the opinion seems to be moving since it is arguably remarkable
that Fox’s lawyers didn’t dismiss out of hand as unwarranted by existing law, see FED.R.CIV.P. 11(b)(2),
the theory proposed by their client. Indeed, that is part of what makes it such a good example, that the court
and most obserevers seemed to think the claim was facially ridiculous. Apparently it wasn’t ridiculous
enough to deter Fox’s lawyers. For a survey of much more troubling cases where corporations have been
more successful in suppressing expression see Vladeck, Lessons From a Story Untold, supra note 42 at
112-118 and accompanying text. For a book length treatment of the subject see KEMBREW MCLEOD,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: OVERZEALOUS COPYRIGHT BOZOS AND OTHER ENEMIES OF CREATIVITY
(Doubleday, 2005).
54
Thomas Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 888 (1963).
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The argument is in three parts. First, in Part I, I review the structure and laws
governing corporations (at least in the United States) to explore the theory of corporate
personhood and its implications as well as the structural incentives that reduce all
corporate communication to a single aim - profits.55 Part II takes Thomas Emerson’s
seminal work on the theoretical basis for protecting freedom of expression and argues
that none of the arguments Emerson identifies offer any grounds, let alone compelling
ones, for granting anything like complete protection to commercial expression by
corporations. Part III addresses some of the persistent counter-arguments and why they
should not represent an obstacle to limitations on corporate speech. In conclusion, I argue
these factors suggest that treating corporations as entitled to the same rights to freedom of
expression as human beings represents a gross distortion of the values freedom of
expression is meant to protect and imperils legitimate governmental health, safety and
other social welfare goals without the prospect of any offsetting gains or realistic checks
on the predictable abuse of power by corporations to be forthcoming from any sources
other than government.
PART I – The Structure of A Corporation
It appears to have always been a matter of some conceptual difficulty how the law
ought to deal with corporations. The idea that corporations are “persons” for purposes of
the law is one of long standing.56 Initially, corporations were thought to have a right to
existence based upon the grant of a charter from the government.57 But the
understanding was that such charters were to be sparingly granted and only where the
proposed corporate enterprise served some greater purpose for the common good rather
than merely the maximization of wealth for investors. As a creature of the state the
corporation was entirely subject to the state, which often prescribed in some detail how
the corporation was to be governed internally. This concept of the corporation – with its
quasi-public function and strict regulation by government situates the corporation as a
kind of extension of the government.58
However, from the beginning, this notion of charter was mitigated somewhat by
being interpreted as a charter that had been negotiated with the government in question
and thus also involved contractual rights that once established could be protected from
interference.59 As the use of the corporate form expanded, this understanding, of the
55

Although there continue to be arguments that corporate goals are more nuanced than pure profit,
certainly short-term profit, it is still fair to say that profit in some form is the only goal on which there is
unanimity of opinion regarding its legitimacy.
56
See supra note 34.
57
See HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, supra note 34at 72 -73.
58
See, e.g., Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995). ([W]here, as here, the
Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and
retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the
corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment.”).
59
See Trustees of Darmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (a corporation only
possesses the attributes that its charter bestow upon it and it does so to the same degree a natural person
would have such rights via contract and thus the state could not unilaterally amend that contract).
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meaning of the corporate form, seemed less suitable or even practicable once states began
to enter into a competition to offer the most attractive legal environment for incorporation
by relaxing or dispensing with much of the regulatory supervision.60 “Gradually, by
making the corporate form universally available, free incorporation undermined the grant
theory. Incorporation eventually came to be regarded not as a special state-conferred
privilege but as a normal and regular mode of doing business.”61 Instead of being a
creature of the law the corporate form seemed a natural and reasonable form of
organization for the conduct of business, a form for which there was no burning need for
government to micro-manage outside of those industries that might be deemed “natural
monopolies” and thus still fitting somewhat comfortably into this schema that required
corporations to serve a “public” function.
As the free incorporation model came to predominate, the entity theory and
notions of corporate personhood continued to gain ground. “By rendering the corporate
form normal and regular, late-nineteenth-century corporate theory shifted the
presumption of corporate regulation against the state. Since corporations could no longer
be treated as special creatures of the state, they were entitled to the same privileges as all
other individuals and groups.”62 So today it apparently seems completely natural and
reasonable for corporations’ representatives to claim that the corporation has expressive
rights as an aspect of personhood. But it is important to remember that the metaphor of
corporate personhood is just that. A metaphor. Nevertheless, this metaphor elides
several aspects of the corporate form that make corporate expression relentlessly onesided and, ultimately, untrustworthy.
The Primacy of the Profit Motive
Pursuant to conventional interpretations of black letter corporate law the
corporation’s officers and directors have primarily one duty – to maximize shareholder
value.63 Furthermore, this duty accrues not to the real people who happen to be
shareholders and the multiplicity of concerns that they can be expected to have as human

See, e.g., HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 34at 73.
Id.
62
Id. at 74.
63
As Professor Elhauge has pointed out, this “black letter” law has always been fairly significantly
modified by the business judgment rule in a fashion that not only permits some profit-sacrificing behavior
but actually virtually guarantees it because of the moral and social pressures on managers. See Elhauge,
Sacrificing Corporate Profits, supra note 17 80 N.Y. U. L. REV. at 740-4. However, even Professor
Elhauge agrees that profit maximization is the management’s “primary obligation” to shareholders. Id. at
745. The business judgment rule arguably represents an implicit understanding that transferring the
decision to the courts of what specific action would be “profit maximizing” in any particular situation
would result in significant increases in transaction costs and that the resultant inefficiency would virtually
guarantee further reductions in profits. Nevertheless, the existence of such discretion represents no
assurance that the discretion will be exercised in a manner consistent with the public interest. See, The
Good Company, THE ECONOMIST, January 22-28th, 2005 (Special section at 3-22). Moreover, this
conventional understanding has been trenchantly criticized by Professor Daniel Greenwood. See
Greenwood, Daniel J.H., "Are Shareholders Entitled to the Residual?" (September 2, 2005). Utah Legal
Studies Paper No. 05-10 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=799144.
60
61
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beings. Rather, this duty only accrues to a fictional shareholder who cares for nothing
but short-term financial gain.
[H]uman shareholders who are also neighbors or employees or customers or
friends may have other commitments beyond an extra nickel in the quarterly
dividend. Even on purely economic issues, since shareholdings in this country are
not only wide but shallow, many shareholders will find that their basic interests
are aligned more with employees, stability or customers than with the highest
possible value for their shareholdings: a decrease in your phone bill is likely to be
worth more to you than the commensurate drop in the price of the telephone
company shares held by your pension fund. Only foreign shareholders with little
connection to the American economy or politics beyond their shareholdings
approximate this conventional image of a shareholder always interested in higher
stock returns.64
Since the fictional shareholder is just an investor, it is immortal and time
indifferent--the market allows any investor to transform future income into
present income, short term gains into long terms ones, and so on, simply by
applying the correct discount rate. It is context indifferent--since money is
perfectly fungible, a pure shareholder is indifferent between money earned in Salt
Lake City or Cambridge; Flint or Manilla. It has no commitment to particular
enterprises: so long as the investment is on the capital frontier, offering the
appropriate risk adjusted rate of return, one project is as good as any other. Tin
cans and insurance, news magazines and amusement parks--what the company
does is a matter of entire indifference. It is universalist in the modernist, not the
post-identity, sense: the fictional shareholder recognizes no boundaries, professes
no nationality (or, more precisely, will change nationalities at the current or future
monetary exchange rate), has no religion, no community, no union, no gender
and, oddly enough, no class: the invested funds of the unions are no different from
the invested funds of the capitalists against which they struggle. It is, in short,
radically uncommitted, cosmopolitan, deracinated, tied to no religion, language,
nation or community. Perhaps most important for bargaining purposes, the
shareholder is fully mobile--able to leap borders (and professions, commitments
and projects) at a single bound.65
This vision of the shareholder has a lot in common with the economists’ darling,
the rational person, primarily in its lack of correspondence in characteristics to any real
person since real human beings are not so narrowly focused. Yet, like the fictional
rational person, the fictional rational shareholder offers analysts and managers an
64

Greenwood, supra note 11 at 1036. It may be that Greenwood underestimates the degree to which
institutional investors, primarily the managers of pension funds, do behave this way because the
aggregation of many shareholders into a fund has the same affect – this is, of reducing the variety of
shareholder interests to a single value, profit. However, the growth of institutional funds that are formed
with the objective of investing only in certain types of companies may have made the fictional shareholder
model less relevant as an empirical matter than in times past. However, my sense is that such investment
funds still represent the minority of investors. They are also not indifferent to profit.
65
Id. at 1043 (internal footnotes omitted).
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attractively simple, and comparatively straightforward way to analyze performance since
attempting to address all the multiplicity of factors that may actually motivate
shareholders would probably be impossibly complex and certainly unwieldy. So the
fictional shareholder continues to be the yardstick against which management and
analysts measure the performance of a company.
The only limitations on how corporations carry out that duty to shareholders are
those imposed by law, that is, what the law says they can and cannot do in aid of
maximizing shareholder value. That makes corporate “behavior” and “speech” very
narrow, shallow and one-dimensional. All roads, all expression, all actions, lead back to
the (hoped for, if often unrealized) maximization of shareholder value. That makes the
corporation a very unusual “person” since few people can be said to hold one, and only
one value. It might, additionally, be protested that it is an inaccurate picture since,
because corporations are run by persons, and persons do have other interests, that those
interests and personalities inevitably are reflected in the corporation. To a limited extent
this is true.
Around the margins of the ambiguity about what exactly is best for shareholders –
long run stability, short term gain, corporate image, etc., the personalities and the choices
made by a corporation’s executive can and do make a difference – and not solely in the
negative ways of a Dennis Kozlowski or a Jeffrey Skilling, but also in positive ways such
as a Warren Buffet or a Ray Anderson.66 Additionally, the business judgment rule and
management perceptions of what sorts of profit-sacrificing behavior is appropriate and
necessary to conform to social norms, allows for some behavior that is not
straightforwardly profit-seeking to occur.67 Still, ultimately the relentless forces of the
market, and the legal imperatives supporting resort to the market, force even the most
vociferous advocates of a “different” kind of corporate model into the same old model—
certainly this is the case with respect to large, public corporations. Thus, Anita Roddick,
founder of The Body Shop, had to step down from her position as chair of the company
and relinquish control of the company, including its much vaunted social responsibility
programs.68 Ben and Jerry’s was bought by Unilever.69 As Professor Joel Bakan reports,
Roddick’s successor at The Body Shop asserted, “We believe in social responsibility but
we are very hard-nosed about profit. We know that success is measured by the bottom
line.”70 “Roddick’s story illustrates how an executive’s moral concerns and altruistic
desires must ultimately succumb to her corporations overriding goals.”71
66

Ray Anderson is “the founder and chairman of Interface, Inc., the world’s largest commercial carpet
manufacturer,” and an outspoken proponent of a switch to manufacturing processes that contribute to
sustainability. BAKAN, supra note 15 at 71.
67
See Elhauge, supra note 17.
68
BAKAN, supra note 15 at 51-53.
69
Janger, supra 2 at 74 (citing Ben and Jerry’s Financial History, available at
http://www.benjerry.com/our_company/research_library/fin/ (last visited on Aug. 24, 2005).
70
BAKAN, supra note 15 at 53.
71
Id. It is worth noting that Roddick has been questioned about the consistency of these goals in a number
of quarters with claims that her much vaunted values have been (how ironic) more cosmetic than
substantive. See, e.g., STAUBER AND RAMPTON, TOXIC SLUDGE, supra note 32at 73 -76 (exploring
conflicts between Body Shop founder’s stated business objectives and principles and the actual conduct of
the company).
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Although the idea of Corporate Social Responsibility [CSR], that is the practice of
a corporation taking account of the interests of constituencies beyond shareholders,72 has
gained popularity, that movement suffers from the absence of a legal structure that will
offer officers and directors clear guidance on what is a permissible departure from the
pure profit, shareholder maximization, model. One the one hand, as Professor Einer
Elhauge points out, the business judgment rule and existing structures are capacious
enough to protect judgments that trade off short tem profits for long term benefits.73 So
shifting between long and short term payoffs could (theoretically) offer no obstacle to the
implementation of CSR. On the other hand, when the magnitude of long term gains are
difficult to predict with any certainty, or are intangible, management could still
conceivably expose themselves to shareholder liability if the alleged long term benefits
are intangible enough and the sacrificed short term profits (or costs incurred) are very
large for and CSR project.74
In addition, there are no clear definition of what “corporate social responsibility”
consists of and very little in the way of standards assessing it.75 “[C]ompanies fasten the
label to a quite bewildering variety of supposedly enlightened, progressive or charitable
corporate actions.”76 Moreover, the results are inconsistent.
This may be why The Economist offered the editorial opinion that CSR was ill
conceived.
The goal of a well-run company may be to make profits for its shareholders, but
merely in doing that – provided it faces the competition in its markets, behaves
honestly and obeys the law77 – the company, without even trying, is doing good
works. Its employees willingly work for the company in exchange for wages; the
transaction makes them better off. Its customers willing pay for the company’s
products; the transaction makes them better off also. All the while, for strictly
selfish reasons, well-run companies will strive for friendly long-term relations
with employees, suppliers and customers. There is no need for selfness sacrifice
when it comes to stakeholders. It goes with the territory.
***

See, e.g., BAUMAN, WEISS & PALMITER, CORPORATIONS LAW & POLICY, supra note 10 at 116-117
(discussing state statutes providing shelter within business judgment rule for constituencies such as
employees, suppliers, creditors, etc.); Cynthia Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of
Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705 (2002); Paul Cox, The Public the Private and the
Corporation, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 391 (1997).
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See Elhauge, supra note 63.
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Professor Bakan reports that the famous economist, Milton Friedman suggests that there is only “one
instance when corporate social responsibility can be tolerated ...—when it is insincere.” BAKAN, THE
CORPORATION, supra note 15at 34.
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The Union of Concerned Executive: CSR as practised means many different things, THE ECONOMIST,
January 22, 2005 at 6in a special report, A Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility.
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Id.
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This is both a very big “provided” and tautological since the very thing that some CSR proponents are
suggesting is that the law require it. Thus, “obeying the law” provides both no inkling of the law’s content
and no limitation.
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All things considered, there is much to be said for leaving social and economic
policy to governments. They are least accountable to voters.78
That this rosy picture contains a number of enormous caveats or questionable
empirical assumptions seems obvious.79 From the beginning of this country’s existence
the question of what sorts of regulatory limits should be placed on the pursuit of the
accumulation of capital and whether it can always be said that what is in the best interest
of business is necessarily in the best interest of society as well has been an issue of fierce
debate and fluctuating legislative trends. The existence of the minimum wage and
antitrust laws, just to mention two examples, would seem to suggest that public sentiment
has not always found the two, corporate interests and the public interest, to be
coextensive. Nevertheless, this argument seems to have enjoyed a resurgence in the later
part of the 20th century and into our present time.80 So it is worthwhile to reiterate what
may seem to be obvious questions. First, the editorial offers the observation that, of
course, the company may only maximize profits within the limits of the law. But when it
comes to corporate speech, this may be precisely the problem: What does the law permit?
If it permits lying, does a corporation have a duty to do so? And if the law virtually
demands that the company communicate in ways that are deceptive, it is difficult to see
how that adds to the general well-being, even if one were inclined to accept the other
dubious assertions about workers and consumers always being “better” off as a result of
this imperative. In fact, there is little reason to expect that they will be.
Corporations as Externalizing Machines
Corporations generate what economists call “externalities,” that is cost to others
associated with the production of their goods and services. Something is “external” by
virtue of its cost being absorbed outside the company.81 Environmental pollution is a
familiar example of an externality. Less familiar, perhaps more subtle externalities might
be the social costs to individuals of the requirement that human capital, particularly for
top executives, be highly mobile82 or requiring working hours incompatible with raising a
family or caring for an elderly parent or other dependent person.83 “The corporation [] is
The Good Company, THE ECONOMIST, January 22, 2005 at 11.
Characterizing workers as “willingly” working in exchange for wages when some sort of work is
necessary for survival for most people and where the wage for most work is set by the employer, not
negotiated by the worker borders is disingenuous. Claiming that consumers are better off for having
“willingly” paid for products that were relentlessly promoted to them and which they may not need or may
be affirmatively hazardous to their health (such as cigarettes) borders on the delusional.
80
See, e.g., Hansmann and Kraakman, supra note 17.
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Identifying internal and external may be very sensitive to assessments of causal relationships. For
example, if rootlessness contributes to reduced social support networks and long hours add to stress and
both make workers more vulnerable to depression, alcoholism and drug abuse or other mental disorders or
to stress-related physical ailments like heart-attacks, the corporation does not succeed in completely
externalizing costs because of lost worker productivity, health care costs and the like. However these
connections are disputed.
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See Peter T. Kilborn, The Five Bedroom, Six Figure Rootless Life, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 1,
2005.
83
See Marleen O’Connor-Felman, American Corporate Governance and Children: Investing in Our Future
Human Capital During Turbulent Times, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1255 (2004).
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an externalizing machine, in the same way that a shark is a killing machine.”84 “The
corporation [] is deliberately programmed, indeed legally compelled, to externalize costs
without regard for the harm it may cause to people, communities and the natural
environment.”85
This doesn’t make the corporation form evil, just amoral.86 If slave labor became
legal, corporations might arguably have a duty to engage in it under the current legal
regime.87 If it became legal to kill rival executives, or steal trade secrets, or kill people
for lucrative body parts, then presumably all corporations would do those things too – not
just the renegade few. It is the law that sets these limits. Because a corporation has “no
body to kick and no soul to damn,”88 these penalties largely consist of monetary
penalties. But calibrating the amount of the penalty to represent a real disincentive has
always been difficult. And because the profits are so enormous, the penalties assume a
size that, taken in a vacuum, seem self-evidently excessive to some. But if it looked at in
the context of the amount at stake may not seem so excessive. For example, the recent
$253.5 million dollar verdict entered against Merck in the Vioxx case included a figure
BAKAN, supra note 15 at 70 quoting businessman Robert Monks from an interview with the author.
Id. at 72-73.
86
In a recent article Professor Douglas Litowitz asks the question, “Are Corporations Evil?” and concludes
that although there is much to be said for what he calls the criticisms of the structural problems in the
organization of corporations, he concludes that it is actually size, not the corporate form which is most at
fault. Douglas Litowitz, Are Corporations Evil?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 814-15 (2004). He notes that
most corporate critics don’t extend their criticisms to “mom-and-pop corporations.” Id. He has a point and
many of the observations here apply only to the large, publicly held corporations. However, given that
some observers consider the close corporation virtually “obsolete” and that large scale partnerships and
limited partnerships that Litowitz identifies as occasionally perpetrators of misconduct that makes the
news, operate under the same imperatives for profit, focus on the form may be just an argument about
details. All of the arguments herein can be applied to the partnership or other business organizational
forms to the extent that they diffuse responsibility and focus on profits for shareholders, partners or
investors. The key may be whether there is any real accountability to anyone but themselves.
87
Some would say that corporations like Nike (or its subcontractors) already do engage in something that
falls short of “slave labor” only insofar as it does not include legal ownership of employees’ person, but
otherwise involves much of its aspects – lack of real freedom, oppressive working conditions, physical
punishment, control through sexual battery, etc. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., Amended Complaint, supra note
44 at 10-15 (describing alleged corporeal punishment and other oppressive labor practices of Nike subcontractors’ factories in Vietnam, Indonesia and China). But one doesn’t need to travel outside of the U.S.
to encounter businesses willing to engage in tactics bordering on the employment of slave labor. The use
of illegal immigrants as migrant farmer workers who are controlled by the threat of disclosure to the
authorities offer one persistent example. And in Tulsa, Oklahoma, a local business was charged with
slavery for allegedly importing workers from India and then holding them hostage on the premises, denying
them adequate wages, freedom of movement, etc. that would enable them to leave. The employer, John
Pickle Co., was found to have violated minimum wage laws by importing workers from India for what it
described as a “training” program, even though the workers were actually highly skilled welders and the
like, so as to evade the minimum wage law. Michael Overall, Verdict blasts Pickle: The company
displaced U.S. workers with cheap foreign labor a judge rules in part one of the trial, TULSA WORLD at
A1, 8/27/2004. Those workers also alleged that the company held them prisoner in a factory dormitory,
confiscated their passports and other documents and would not allow them to leave the factory even when
off duty and had lied to them about the status of the immigration visas that would be obtained for them. Id.
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NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA, supra note 34 at 5 (“As Baron Thurlow said some three centuries ago, ‘Did
you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be
kicked?’”).
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for punitive damages that was “not picked at random.”89 Rather it was a figure pulled
from “a 2001 Merck estimate of additional profit the company might make if it could
delay an F.D.A. warning on Vioxx’s heart risk.” 90 Note the calculus that Merck engaged
in – what truthful communication would cost it. Nevertheless, because defendants such
as Merck have successfully managed to convince the public and the legislatures to focus
on the size of such verdicts in isolation, they have succeeded in securing the passage of
caps on liability that reduce such awards, and thereby diminish their effectiveness as
penalties.91
Even these limits will be exceeded if a corporation’s executives conclude that the
penalties exacted by the law will not diminish profits sufficient to represent a deterrence
to similar misconduct in the future.92 As Professor Bakan observes, “Corporate
illegalities are rife throughout the economy. Many major corporations engage in
unlawful behavior, and some are habitual offenders with records that would be the envy
of even the most prolific human criminals.”93 As an example he lists the 42 violations or
judgments, most relating to environmental issues, against General Electric for the period
between 1990 and 2001.94
On the other hand, not all outcomes driven by the profit motive are necessarily
bad. If images and entertainment about gay and lesbians are more prominent in the
culture it may have a lot to do with manufacturers playing to a market.95 Many of us
view this as a morally worthwhile phenomenon that contributes to a more inclusive
society. But not everyone agrees.96 And those who don’t could point to this as another
outgrowth of the “immorality” of corporate tunnel vision with respect to the profit
motive. Similarly, many companies have integrated the images in their advertising to
include more people of color, more women (outside of advertising for cosmetics, clothing
and the like) and have discovered it “pays” to recognize the Hispanic market or the
Alex Berenson, For Merck, the Vioxx Paper Trail Won’t Go Away, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Sunday,
August 21, 2005, 1 & 17.
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Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
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For example, Texas law caps on punitive damages apparently mean that the Vioxx verdict will be
automatically reduced to $26.1 million. Id. at 1.
92
A cap on damages may not completely eliminate the deterrent effect of damage awards where the
company, as does Merck, faces several thousand lawsuits. Id.
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Id. 75
- 79.
95
See, e.g., David M. Skover & Kellye Y. Testy, Lesbigay Idenitiy as Commodity, 90 CAL. L. REV. 223
(2002).
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See Russell Shorto, What's Their Real Problem With Gay Marriage? It's the Gay Part, THE NEW YORK
TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE, Late Edition - Final, Section 6 , Page 34 , Column 1 June 19, 2005
(recounting the fierce objection on moral grounds, by some anti-gay marriage activists, to homosexual
behavior on the grounds of a belief that it represents an immoral choice). The stunning ignorance of
history, science and any sense of the cultural context for the institution of marriage displayed by some of
the subjects interviewed for this article is fairly dispiriting if one believes that good government and a good
society is even, in part, dependent upon information and education. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
individuals interviewed are animated by fervent convictions that they label “moral.” For another example
of the profit motive contributing to equality see Ellen Waldman and Marybeth Herald, Eyes Wide Shut:
Erasing Women’s Experiences from the Clinic to the Courtroom, 28 HARV. J. OF LAW & GENDER 285,
300-03 (2005).
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African-American market, etc. These may all represent social advances for which we can
thank corporate indifference to anything but the profit motive – that is, its moral
neutrality may lead to the morally worthwhile as well as the morally bankrupt. Of course
that may represent little net gain if many of the marketing efforts are for harmful
products.97 Certainly the images of people of color in advertising are arguably still far
from being representative of the people of color in the population. The point though is
that I am not offering any reflexive condemnation of corporations. They are neither
moral nor immoral. They are amoral. They aren’t people. While this fact has side
effects that may be applauded insofar as they are indifferent to any particular moral or
political position, that is not a feature that offers much protection for the minority view or
the outsider.
The . . . internal mechanisms of the corporation do not differentiate between
making money by creating a good product or lobbying the law to avoid the costs
of a bad one. A corporation driven by the profit motive is morally indifferent: it
will lobby to repeal the eight hour day or the EPA, or, alternatively, invest in
additional automation or pollution control devices indifferently, based only on a
cost benefit analysis of which option is likely to cost the shares less. It will
compete with a competitor, or lobby to create a legally regulated monopoly,
indifferent except as to the relative risk-adjusted projected net present values of
the alternatives. It will adapt to a world of long-term employment and family
wages, or advocate one of employee mobility, over-work for some and underemployment for the rest, entirely indifferent to effects on children or civil society
because those effects are not reflected in the returns to the shares.98
In addition to the primacy of the profit motive directed toward the fictional
shareholder and driving the corporation to externalize any costs that it can, the large,
publicly traded corporations are also bureaucracies that increase the potential to diffuse
and dissipate whatever individual, human moral impulses its officers, directors and
employees may have and to contribute ambiguity about moral and legal responsibilities
on the part of employees, 99 a convenient instrument for suppressing guilt feelings about
particular transactions100 and a difficulty in locating responsibility when things do go
wrong.101 Given these features of corporate structure the notion that corporations require
special protection for their expression is troubling. It is difficult to locate any support for
this claim in the theoretical basis on which freedom of expression is protected.
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PART – II Theory and Practice in Protection for Freedom of Expression
Some of those who consider themselves First Amendment purists are fond of
offering a quote attributed to Voltaire along the lines (and I paraphrase), “I disagree with
everything you say but will defend to the death your right to say it,” in support of what is
often described as an absolutist position on the protection of speech. However, at no time
in this country’s history has anything like an absolutist position on the application of the
First Amendment ever held sway in the government or on the Court. Reviewing the
decisions of the Supreme Court on issues of speech one is left with the uncomfortable
feeling that the government is somewhat willing to permit the hostile speech of the
ineffectual crackpots and malcontents and very much less sanguine about hostile or
critical speech when it even appears to pose a threat to some government project or
plan.102 Still, this observation also highlights the fact that one of the principal concerns
supporting the right to freedom of expression is concern about the mandate of a
governmental orthodoxy.103
Nevertheless, as Professor Fredrick Schauer and others have so convincingly
demonstrated, it has never been the case that all speech was equal for purposes of
protection under the First Amendment.104 There has never been in theory a First
Amendment defense to a fraud claim, or to an offer of a bribe or a solicitation of a
murder. All of these may be acts committed by speech, but that speech has not been
102
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CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, June 17, 2005 at A11.
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(http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/rauch2003-06-10.htm); Associated Press, If Nike suit upheld, a
critic becomes a censor, solicitor says, USA TODAY, June 28, 2003)
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thought to be protected by the First Amendment. Until fairly recently, commercial
speech fell into this unprotected category. Commercial speech, or speech by
corporations, (and the definition of what constitutes “commercial speech” is contentious
and unsettled)105 was only extended protection in the late 70’s.106 So there is no
venerable tradition supporting freedom of expression for corporations.107
So what sort of speech was protected and why? In so complicated an area where
no hard and fast lines exist, it is not really possible to fully answer this question as the
scope of protection appears to have always been a work in progress, a tug-of-war
between political currents and powerful interests. But it is possible to identify with some
precision some of the theoretical grounds for protection of freedom of expression, even if
the practical application of those theories, or the question of whether there is any
empirical fit between the theory and practice, are distinct questions. Thomas Emerson,
the prominent First Amendment theorist proposed four purposes for protecting freedom
of expression and despite tweakings of this formula, or claims that no unifying theory is
possible, Emerson’s architecture of the theory for why freedom of expression is protected
remains one of the most influential.108
First, Emerson claimed freedom of expression is a necessary part of selfexpression and thus of personal fulfillment.109 Second, as has been repeated in numerous
court decisions and academic writings, freedom of expression is thought to be the best
method of ensuring discovery of truth.110 (It was on this ground, refusal to shield
consumers from the truth, that a limited amount of protection for commercial speech was
105
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extended in the first place.)111. Third, freedom of speech is argued to offer a basis for
participation in a democracy.112 Fourth, Emerson argued freedom of expression helped to
maintain a balance between impulses to change and those to stability in a society.113
All of these arguments have been offered in support of freedom of commercial
speech.114 In addition, supporters have argued that the failure to protect (that is, render
immune from liability) commercial speech will have bad policy consequences with
respect to corporate transparency and social responsibility reporting115 which in turn is
argued will have a negative impact on commercial relations with Europe to the extent that
such transparency is required in order to do business there.116 It has also been argued that
111

See Virginia Pharmacy supra note 30 at 763-65.
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a failure to offer the same protection to business that is offered to its critics would be
“unfair” and represent an “imbalance” in the debate.117 (This is perhaps a variation on
the theory that more open debate is more likely to lead to the truth). All of these claims
will be discussed and rebutted in more detail below.
Self-realization
None of Emerson’s theoretical justifications for the protection of freedom of
expression appear to offer much in the way of support for freedom of commercial
expression. First, as a non-human entity a corporation cannot be said to have the
expressive interests related to self-actualization and freedom that persons do. As
Emerson put it, the right to freedom of expression is necessary to human beings because:
[E]xpression is an integral part of the development of ideas, of mental exploration
and of the affirmation of self. The power to realize his potentiality as a human
being begins at this point and must extend at least this far if the whole nature of
man is not to be thwarted.118
Corporations don’t have a “self” to be actualized or affirmed. Its employees may have
them. Its shareholders may have them. But corporations don’t. When a corporation’s
agents speak on its behalf they are not expressing themselves they are following orders or
fulfilling duties and they are doing so responsive to the corporation’s single objective:
Profit maximization. Thus,
[c]orporate speech is coerced, not free. It is compelled, legally mandated speech,
not the result of anyone’s autonomous behavior. It does not reflect the views of
shareholders, nor, if management is acting in good faith, those of managers or
other corporate agents. Instead, corporate speech reflects the hypothetical
interests of a creature given reality by the market and the law: the fictional
shareholder. 119
The fictional shareholder is just that, a fiction, a mental construction no more embodied
than the “+” in an equation. It is a principle if you will. As Professor Greenwood puts it,
a corporation’s “principal is merely a principle, an abstraction, not a human being.
[Principles, unlike principals, do not have any autonomy rights to be respected.”120 Nor
do the people speaking on behalf of the corporation have autonomy rights with respect to
their expression since it is not their own expression. However much their own creativity
and interests may align with the corporation’s, at the end of the day they are agents
speaking on the corporation’s behalf – following orders, whether or not they agree with
those orders. And “...as Eichmann has taught us, people who are just following orders
are neither full moral subjects nor appropriate participants in the difficult debates of the
political forum.”121
Thus, if there is a justification for the protection for commercial speech selfexpression does not seem to be a part of that justification – at least not speaker self117
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expression.122 Still, Professor Martin Redish has suggested that perhaps “the function of
self-rule is fostered by the receipt of information that enables the individual to make lifeaffecting decisions in a more informed fashion.”123 In other words, perhaps by giving
corporations freedom to speak, more information is generated that in turn supports the
goal of self-actualization or development. There may be something to this. But in this
sense the speech generated by corporations represents the “clay” from which individuals
model their statements about self. But how does false speech that enhances a
corporation’s profitability enhance this goal other than by making a particular brand of
symbol, perhaps like the availability of a particular color on the palette of an artist? And
if there are significant social costs, for example environmental pollution or perpetuation
of a labor practice that consumers actually intend to disavow with their purchases but end
up supporting with them instead – do the expressive benefits of the availability of the
Nike brand with which to signify something about oneself offset these social costs?
Arguably they do not.
Traditionally the law has regulated false speech on the grounds of the social costs
associated with it and the notion that the law has a role in enforcing true in certain
situations. It is difficult to conclude however, for the reasons explored above that for
profit corporations will ever disseminate unfavorable information except under
compulsion.124 However, much of the speech issued by for profit corporations is
persuasive speech that is not necessarily informative. Indeed, one would be hard-pressed
to identify the “information” in much advertising. But more importantly, can speech that
is not true ever be considered “information”?
Truth
The most emphasized theoretical basis provided protection to freedom of speech
is the notion that it is only through an open exchange of ideas that the truth is most likely
to emerge.125 Virtually all the variations on the theoretical framework proposed by
Emerson turn around this idea that truth, or at least that the individual’s “truth” as
expressed through their choices representing the maximization of their utilities, will best
122
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find expression or satisfaction through minimal restraint on the marketplace of ideas.
This is certainly the claim most emphasized by Nike and its supporters during the course
of that case.126 This is also the basis on which one of the most prominent proponents of
freedom of commercial expression, Professor Martin Redish, has based his argument.127
“Information received in the commercial context...is specifically designed to assist the
individual in the decision-making process,” he claims.128 One might quarrel with several
characterizations in this sentence, but the principal one of concern here is “information.”
As Redish himself noted in 1971, even “[a] cursory examination of current television and
periodical advertising reveals that in practice, comparatively little commercial promotion
performs a purely informational function.”129
It would seem that commercial advertising (which is what Redish was describing,
not public relations or advocacy speech), is even less “informative” now, in 2005, than it
was then, more than thirty years ago. Nevertheless, Professor Redish’s arguments won
out when some five years after the publication of his article arguing for some protection
for advertising, the Supreme Court decided that the public did indeed have as much
interest in hearing correct price information as it did hearing about the news of the day.130
It was on this basis, the consumer’s right to receive information, that the Court extended
a limited protection to commercial speech. But self-expression for the corporation
played no part in the justification for this extension. The Court reserved to the
government the right to regulate commercial speech for its truth.131
If the prospect of getting to the truth is the justification for extending protection
for speech, it would seem that justification similarly offers a basis for the regulation of
speech under conditions where the structural incentives are so clearly slanted toward
communication that will persuade, regardless of whether it will “inform.”132 Marketing is
the paradigmatic example of such a context. Some marketing professionals openly claim
that truth is irrelevant to sales.133 This is, of course, not an astonishing observation.

126

See supra, notes 103 and 115.
See Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace, 39 GEO.WASH.L.REV. 429 (1971). In
fact he also convincingly folds self-government into self-actualization claiming that Emerson’s third value
is really just a manifestation of the first value. Id. at 439.
128
Id. supra note 127 at 445.
129
Id. at 433.
130
As the Court in Virginia Pharmacy noted, “[T]he particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of
commercial information ...may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent
political debate.” Virginia Pharmacy, supra note 30 at 763.
131
“In concluding that commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected, we of course do not hold that it
can never be regulated... Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own
sake. ...The First Amendment, as we construe it today does not prohibit the State from insuring that the
stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely.” Virginia Pharmacy, supra note 30 at
770-72 (internal citations omitted). See also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of
new York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (in order for commercial speech to be protected by the First
Amendment the speech “must concern lawful activity and not be misleading”).
132
See, e.g., Sarah C. Haan, The “Persuasion Route” of the Law: Advertising and Legal Persuasion, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (2000).
133
“The facts are irrelevant. In the short run, it doesn’t matter one bit whether something is actually better
or faster or more efficient. What matters is what the consumer believes.” Seth Godin, The Storytellers
127

25

Rather it predictable and intuitive, if only because consumers have a limited amount of
time and access to reliable information from which to assess marketing claims, quite
apart from whether or not marketing operates on non-rational thought processes in the
first place.
If, as I explored more fully above, corporations have a duty to communicate in
ways that will maximize shareholder value by generating profits and good publicity, then
if they are permitted to communicate false information that will generate value and they
can do so without legal consequences they will do so.134 In fact, as noted in the
introduction, even with existing laws governing fraud and dealing with corporate
statements it always possible that a corporation will decide that it is not cost effective to
follow the law. Consider the case of Phillip Morris. On September 22, 1999 the United
States brought a case against several tobacco companies and some of their public
relations arms, alleging a conspiracy to commit fraud to endanger the lives of millions of
Americans by concealing or misrepresenting the evidence of the negative health
consequences of smoking. 135 The government alleged that “[i]n order to avoid discovery
of their fraudulent conduct and the possibility that they might be called to account for
their conduct, defendants engaged in a widespread scheme to frustrate public scrutiny by
making false and deceptive statements and by concealing documents and research that
they knew would have exposed their public campaign of deceit.”136 The motive? “[T]he
shared goals of maximizing profits.”137 The tobacco companies largely furthered this
conspiracy by maintaining that the question of whether smoking had negative health
questions was a matter of debate. In 2005 the negative health consequences of smoking
appear beyond “debate.” But it appears from the case that the behavior of concealing
evidence or violating the law did not end with the collapse of that “debate.”
Instead this pattern of “concealing” documents continued into the trial itself, for
on July 21, 2004, Judge Kessler, the presiding judge, ordered Phillips Morris to pay a
monetary discovery sanction of $2.75 million dollars for spoliation, or destruction, of the
evidence. The sanction was assessed because the judge found that Phillip Morris’ failure
to comply with a court order requiring document retention reflected “reckless disregard
and gross indifference [by Phillip Morris and its parent Altria Group] toward their
discovery and document preservation obligation.”138 Defendants had destroyed, pursuant
to their document destruction policy, some email records that an earlier court order
required them to preserve. Then when the destruction was discovered, defendants failed
to notify the government and the court of that fact for several months.
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Why would a good corporate citizen, as Altria, the parent company for Phillip
Morris, undoubtedly like to be viewed by the public,139 flout a court order? Could this be
a rogue company?140 A hint might be found in the judge’s own opinion. She noted that it
was difficult to calculate a proportional sanction, as is required by the rules,141 “because
we have no way of knowing what, if any value those destroyed emails had to Plaintiff’s
case...”142 In other words, there was no way of knowing what value the evidence was to
plaintiff. But it was possible to look at what was at stake for the defendants. The
government had originally sought $280 billion in damages. Although an appellate court
rejected the claim for anything but forward-looking damages,143 the possibility still
existed that liability would run into the billions, not the millions. In that light, $ 2.75
million would be a small price to pay if the evidence that was destroyed reduced the
probabilities of a multi-billion dollar verdict.144
Apart from the ubiquitous profit motive, there is the additional problem that even
when a corporation is found to have “lied,” it may be difficult to attribute that lie and the
requisite intentionality to any person, thereby making a corporate criminal conviction
virtually impossible. For example, the government succeeded in garnering a conviction
against Arthur Andersen for its role in the Enron debacle. But that conviction was later
overturned by the United States Supreme Court’s conclusion that the jury instructions
were too vague on the mens rea issue and therefore might permit a conviction without
evidence of the requisite criminal intent.145 Of course establishing corporate intent is
itself a somewhat metaphysical proposition since we can only find “intent” in its
employees, but the dispersal of authority, knowledge and responsibility may mean that
everyone can plausibly claim they didn’t know what they were doing was wrong so a
criminal conviction of any individual may be elusive as well.
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In addition to the problems of financial incentives and metaphysical challenges
when it comes to holding corporations liable for misstatements (thus giving little
structural incentive to tell unpleasant truths), there are yet other roadblocks to the truth
function – sometimes the regulatory authorities themselves support corporate reluctance
to be more forthcoming. For example, it is not much help for a particular regulatory
effort if the head of that effort, be it an agency or a prosecution, views his or her job as
being in “partnership” with business146 or, even worse, decides he or she is not in favor of
a particular regulatory or disciplinary effort and thus wants to withdraw it. This
happened in the 70s with the head of the FTC.147. And it has happened more recently
when the Department of Justice submitted a request for “only” $ 10 billion in damages in
the above mentioned tobacco prosecution, instead of the expected $130 billion or so
indicating that it had not done so as a result of political pressure but leaving many
observers skeptical about that statement.148 In the face of the evidence of such enormous
influence in the political process, the argument that these entities, corporations, need
additional advantages and protection beggars belief.
As if this were not enough, as the McLibel case in the U.K. and Fox Network’s
lawsuit in the U.S. [against comedian Al Franken for the use of the words “fair and
balanced”] illustrate,149 corporate interests often aggressively litigate against the speech
of others that they find offensive. This undoubtedly has, and is meant to have a chilling
effect on anyone else who has a mind to criticize the companies in question.150
Moreover, advertisers often have enormous influence on media content and can withdraw
their advertising dollars from media and from messages with which they disagree or
which they find presents the “wrong” environment for their ads.151 Corporations have no
interest in democracy per se. They have an interest in supporting whatever legal regime
guarantees the most congenial environment in which to generate profits. Thus,
corporations do not hesitate to re-incorporate in Liberia or the Bahamas or to move
certain parts of their operations to other countries simply because they were initially
incorporated in the United States. Kasky alleged that Nike spent almost $1 billion in
fiscal year 1997 on marketing,152 yet Nike argued to the Supreme Court that without
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constitutional protection from liability for false speech it would be “silenced” and it
would not be able to participate in the “debate” about globalization.153 A billion dollars
is a lot of speech. Given the economic imperatives discussed above, it is unlikely that
Nike will be silenced by any penalties. What this adds up to is the conclusion that it
naive to think that in this environment more protection for commercial speech, that is,
removing the flimsy existing constraints on it, is likely to lead to more truth, a better
debate or any more information.
Participation in Democracy
A third justification offered for the protection for freedom of expression is that
freedom of expression is a prerequisite to democracy. A democracy isn’t really a
democracy without the participation of its citizens. Citizens require protection for their
expression in order to fully participate. However, although Nike characterized itself in
the case before the Supreme Court as a “citizen” it is not. Corporations are not citizens.
And as such have (or rather ought to have) no role in the participation in democracy.154
This is not to say of course that their representatives can’t offer opinions. But it is to say
that corporations are not entitled to opinions. Corporations do not vote. Yet it is
apparent to the meanest intelligence that of course corporations have a major, if not the
dominant role in our democracy. Corporations play key roles in urging legislation upon
Congress and with a large measure of success, as the recent revisions to the bankruptcy
code, urged by the credit card companies for their benefit illustrate.155 Corporations can
offer legislators attractive trips to luxurious locales under the pretext of “education.”156
They can invest billions in non-profit organizations to act as fronts, such as alleged in the
tobacco litigation with the Tobacco Research Institute.157 They can invest billions in
putting together “astroturf” organizations to lobby legislators – that is, organizations that
resemble grassroots organizations pulled together by citizens but which are really made
up of persons paid by the industry in question to pose as “concerned citizens.”158 All of
these represent influences on government. They suggest that the average large
corporation has far more “voice,” far more participation in our democracy than most real
citizens do. It is difficult to understand how requiring such communications be truthful,
where the truth can be ascertained, will injure democracy.
In addition, the opinions of corporations need not be respected as the collective
voice of its shareholders. “[O]pinions offered by corporations are not themselves the
product of a democratic struggle to formulate a point of view in the face of conflicting or
multiple values.”159 As noted above, corporations have one value–maximizing
153
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shareholder value. Their participation in political issues is invariably centered on that
value.
When a corporation lobbies, however, its goal is set by law and market: it lobbies
on behalf of the principle of the fictional shareholder, to maximize the returns to
an imaginary being with no interests other than its shares in the corporation. No
internal debate, coalition building or political process sets the corporate goal; the
views of the various human participants in the firm are largely irrelevant. Unlike
the group of citizens, then, the corporation speaks in a unified voice on behalf of a
single principle rather than an ever-recreated compromise.160
***
Fictional shareholders ... will sacrifice almost anything in the interest of higher
profit...; in contrast, the citizens behind the fiction can be expected to have far
more diverse and conflicted opinions on ...important political struggles.161
***
This picture of the corporation acting on behalf of a fictional shareholder leads to
the conclusion that corporations are defined by the law and the market in a way
that makes them inappropriate participants in political debate.162
The question raised by the problem of should corporations be treated as human
beings, that is, have extended to them legal protection for their “speech,” is whether they
will be extended advantages in addition to those they already enjoy. Although the
Supreme Court held in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti163 that a corporation had
a right to participate in political debates in some fashion, it stepped back from this
position in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce164 with a reminder that
corporations are, after all, creatures of the state and recipients of special benefits and
advantages from the state not enjoyed by natural persons.
State law grants corporations special advantages--such as limited liability,
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of
assets--that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy their resources in
ways that maximize the return on their shareholders' investments. These statecreated advantages not only allow corporations to play a dominant role in the
Nation's economy, but also permit them to use resources amassed in the economic
marketplace to obtain an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.165
Also, as the Court in Austin noted,
[T]he political advantage of corporations is unfair because "[t]he resources in the
treasury of a business corporation ... are not an indication of popular support for
the corporation's political ideas. They reflect instead the economically motivated
160
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decisions of investors and customers. The availability of these resources may
make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power of the
corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas."166
Even the participation they enjoy at present is arguably too much. It beggars belief that
this justification for protection for speech offers much support to extending more
protections to corporations than they already have.
Balance
Finally Emerson suggested that protection for freedom of expression offered some
play in the joints of democracy, some possibility for blowing off steam and thereby
contributed to social stability. But those persons he envisioned needing a place to vent
were undoubtedly the poor and dispossessed, whom those in power must always fear
should they get excessively disgruntled. Corporations as non-human entities don’t, in the
first place, have an emotional need to blow off steam. But given their privileged position
in the American economy and in the political realm, it is difficult to characterize
corporations as a despised and powerless minority having a grudge they need to vent lest
they upset the government. To the contrary, given corporations’ privileged position, their
request for more privilege under the guise of “balance” looks more like the petulant
demands of a spoiled child. The environment in which discussion of alternative ways of
life can take place is already severely imbalanced and compromised by the firm grip
consumerism and corporate structuring of our wants and needs has in all of our lives –
whether in the first world or elsewhere. Only the truly poor are really free of it since they
don’t present a good market. But then they too suffer the effects. Interest in “balance”
hardly seems to argue in favor of more protection for corporate speech.
In fact, we already live in an environment in which the need for balance goes in
the other direction because pro-corporate speech appears “neutral. If anything, it is the
anti-corporate position which has difficulty getting aired. For example, in Sultans of
Sleaze, author Joyce Nelson describes the efforts in 1988 of the British Columbia Council
of Forest Industries to re-position their industries as “green.”
[The council mounted a massive and expensive campaign to convince the public
of its ‘sound forest and stewardship and reforestation programs.’ The campaign
included educational displays in shopping malls, huge posters at bus stops, ads
inside buses, and colour supplements delivered to most households in the
province. ... Bu the biggest irritant in the whole PR effort was the Council’s
‘Forests Forever’ ads a $2 million pitch on billboards and TV and in print media
in which the Council spokespeople say what a wonderful job they are doing in
managing B.C. forests.167
The ads ran for over a year on CBC-TV despite protests by environmental groups;
but when a counter-ad, “Mystical Forests’, detailing the actual practices of the
166
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logging industry was proposed by environmentalists and presented for CBC
approval, it was turned down as “too controversial.”168
Canadian journalist and social activist Kalle Lasn has had similar problems getting the
broadcast media to air his organization, AdBusters’ ad for “Buy Nothing Day” or for
advertising parodies, leading the Adbusters Media Foundation to initiate legal action that
has (so far) apparently been unsuccessful.169
Similarly, Amtrack attempted to refuse artist Michael Ledron’s ad, which entailed
a photo-commentary on Coors Brewing Company’s support for the Nicaraguan contras
and other right wing causes by parodying the company’s ad campaign which proclaimed
Coor’s to be the Right Beer, with the slogan, “Is it the Right’s Beer Now?”, on the
grounds that Amtrak did not allow “political” advertising on the particular display in
question.170 The characterization of Ledron’s ad as “political” implies Coor’s ad is
not.171 Amtrak attempted to assert its status as a corporation to argue that Lebron could
not claim a violation of his First Amendment rights in connection with its refusal of what
it characterized as political speech.172 The Supreme Court rejected this argument as to
Amtrak, holding that where the government retains complete control over the
corporation, the corporate form may be disregarded and the corporation viewed as an arm
of the government. Nevertheless, it seems clear that a private media company would be
free to reject any ad it found controversial without fear of a First Amendment claim. And
since one of the things of greatest concern for the principal advertisers, the lifeblood of
all media, is that all content in the media present the appropriate selling environment for
their goods, it is easy to see why “[a] message in support of the status quo is typically
considered to be ‘neutral,’ ‘objective’, and ‘non-controversial”, while a message that
departs from the status quo position or criticizes it is considered to have a ‘point of view’
and ‘bias.’”173 That does not suggest that a “balance” is likely to emerge from the current
environment given the distribution of resources and incentives.
But it seems a little silly to have to state what seems to be obvious – that the
corporate form offers an unparalleled opportunity for the accumulation of wealth and
168
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power while at the same time diffusing responsibility. While corporate frustration may
represent a threat to the government, that threat is unlikely to be diffused by offering
corporations freedom from liability for their speech. Large corporations in this world are
powerful. So such regulations as have been passed by the United States and the EU,
member and non-member countries and any other government in the world which limit
corporate speech seem to be engaged in uphill sledding. Why it is so difficult to see this
and why, when Kreuzer Medien GmbH claimed that article 10 of the Human Rights
charter granted protection for freedom of expression for its advertising, was that claim
not rapidly dismissed? It is hard to know, but it might be the power of the metaphor.
Having once named the corporate form as a “person” it may have been difficult to turn
back. Metaphors like the legal “personhood” of corporations and “the marketplace of
ideas” have demonstrated that they have enduring power174 and can apparently, even in
the minds of the most intelligent observers, represent a more appealing starting point of
analysis than one grounded in an analysis of observed characteristics and operation. But
in the case of corporate speech what has happened is that metaphor has taken over the
doctrine and moved the Courts and observers away from the grounds on which limited
protection was offered to commercial expression in the first place – protection of
consumers’ autonomy rights to make their own decisions with all the truthful information
– into a freestanding entitlement for corporations to be free of governmental regulation of
their communications. To the extent that this would shield untruthful communications it
represents a perversion of the doctrine.
Part III - Dealing with the Persistent Objections
Maybe it is the fault of the metaphor.175 But a persistent objection raised to the
argument here is one of speaker discrimination and meaningful line drawing. To the first
objection it is enough to simply point out that if a corporation is not an appropriate
“speaker” then there is no discrimination. Furthermore, there is nothing inherently
inappropriate under existing doctrine about differing standards depending upon the
identity of the speaker. For example, differing standards have been upheld with respect
to attorneys176 than other commercial speakers or the public at large. But this, it might be
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argued, is inadequate because I distinguish between for-profit and not for profit
corporations and the argument is made, “What about the NAACP, the NRA or other
organization formed for political purposes but organized as a corporation?” Furthermore,
what prevents corporations such as Wal-Mart or Phillip-Morris from setting up nonprofits to do their speaking for them? Finally, the argument is made that discriminating
on the basis of marketing versus non-marketing content is inappropriate content
regulation. These are good questions but ultimately not persuasive obstacles to the
argument offered here.177
A. Speaker discrimination and line-drawing
In the first place, the corporate entity is a legal creation, so one response to this
objection is that corporations have the qualities and the rights given to them by law, no
more no less. And just as the law already distinguishes between for-profit and not-for
profit, close and public corporations, with differing rules applicable depending upon the
status of the corporation, so it is not immediately obvious why, if a not-for-profit is
subject to different tax laws it could not be subject to different treatment for purposes of
the first amendment. Additionally, because of differing legal structures, there are very
real differences in the incentive structures as between corporations and non-corporate
business that make differing treatment as to status eminently sensible. As discussed
above, the way in which corporations operate offer a basis for distinguishing between
them and human beings. As professor Elhauge noted with respect to regulating corporate
conduct generally:
Compared to noncorporate businesses, the corporate structure creates two
problems for this supplemental means [social and moral sanctions] of regulating
conduct: (1) Shareholders are insulated from the exposure and knowledge that
creates social and moral sanctions, and (2) shareholders have collective action
problems that make it difficult for them to act on any social or moral impulses
they do feel. Managerial conduct that perfectly represented shareholders would
thus tend to produce socially suboptimal conduct.178
If one were to judge by the tidal wave of “suboptimal” conduct that appears to be
occurring lately, one might be justified in concluding that in general management has
been rather successful in representing at least the fictional shareholder fairly perfectly.
The coverage of corporations under the first amendment is a matter of finding a
theoretical fit between the purpose of the amendment and the “nature” of corporations.
But corporations have no organic “nature.”179 They have the form they are given and
affected with First Amendment concerns. It falls within the State's proper sphere of economic and
professional regulation.”).
177
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thus whether their nature fits the purpose depends on their legal construction. All that is
required is for them to be seen in that light rather than as organic creatures with some
mysterious natural essence. “[R]eification is a device for making something that is in fact
complex seem simple, and that can be dangerous. In reality, only individuals enjoy
benefits, or bear the burdens and responsibilities, of actions affecting other
individuals.”180 While it is obviously over-simplified to add to that quote that “only
individuals have opinions or speech rights,” given that non-profit organizations are often
organized precisely for generating speech, the conclusion that all organizations should
have speech rights doesn’t follow either. The Framers noted the potential for large, forprofit, organizations to accumulate the type of power that can threaten the stability of
democracy.181 The late nineteenth century also saw the growth of massive trust
arrangements that held such power over the markets and government that it culminated in
the government reasserting control over business interests in the form of such trustbusting devices as the Sherman Antitrust Act.182 Thus, “[i]t is [] sensible for a
Constitution which defends individual free expression and associational freedom to
recognize free expression rights for many organization entities but not for corporate
capital.”183 For example,
[in] a union vote, persons are equal. In a corporate vote, shares of capital are
equal, but persons are unequal according to how much capital they respectively
own. The corporate voice then, represents not a plurality and a unity of people or
citizens, but a plurality and unity of capital.184
But this does not avoid the practical objection that the borders are nevertheless
permeable. And when it is difficult to sort out news from promotion or art from product
placement, not every case may be so easy to resolve. Some entities may represent real
mixed purposes entities. Corporations fund real grass roots and non-profits as well as
astroturf organizations and front operations. How are we to tell the difference? If the
local mom & pop grocery store want to protest government zoning regulations and add
the prominence and power of its trade name in lieu of the perhaps less well known names
of the individual owners, well isn’t that permissible and isn’t this proposal starting us
down the slippery slope in which all sorts of valuable speech will be regulated away?
This is an objection that goes to the heart of our more cherished illusions about
the potential of law for establishing certainty. The objection seems so persuasive when
launched in the context of this question of protection for speech. Yet when ones looks
analogize to an organic character is a far cry from saying they have the same dignitary rights accorded
human beings.
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more closely it is clear that almost all of the law is made up of such difficult line-drawing
exercises185 and that in fact, the argument that we must protect the for-profit
corporation’s speech because we cannot tell where to draw the law is an objection that
doesn’t hold up to close scrutiny. The law already makes exceptions as between
corporations on the basis of size for purposes of compliance with laws like SarbanesOxley. In September of 2005 the Securities and Exchange Commission extended a
second extension of time for small business to comply with certain of the provisions of
Sarbanes Oxley.186 “Small” is defined as companies with “a market capitalization of less
than $75 million.”187 As with all line drawing exercises the question could be raised,
“Why $75 million and not $65 million or $100 million?” Drawing a bright-line rule
always runs the risk of over and under-inclusiveness that some of the cases included in
the scope of the rule’s application don’t actually raise the risk of the evils the rule is
meant to address and that some of the cases meant to be controlled by the rule fall outside
of its operation. That is not however a reason not to draw a line. It does not seem at all
absurd to suggest that there may be material and significant differences between forprofit and non-profit, between the corner grocery store and Time-Warner that make a
difference for purposes of the First Amendment.
So the issue here, properly understood, is whether there is more harm to be
anticipated by drawing the line as I propose, to exclude for-profit corporations, or least
large for-profit corporations, from any more speech rights than those announced in the
Virginia Pharmacy case – that is, protection for truthful, non-misleading statements, than
would be the harms flowing from the virtual absence of governmental regulation. A
parallel inquiry might be whether the benefits anticipated from the regulation exceed the
costs or whether, conversely, the benefits of freedom of commercial expression outweigh
any costs. Given that there is no human
To be sure, just as when the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan drew a line of
“actual malice” for sustaining libel claims against public officials on matters of public
concern, it was possible that some meritorious claims would be lost, some libels would
go unpunished and perhaps some new, unanticipated evil would arise as a result which
might require a reassessment of the standard in light of that evil, [although so far it has
not], this proposal, to reject the notion of freedom for commercial expression may run
into future difficulties. But to refuse to act on the basis of a speculative harm or a
speculative difficulty as to how to draw the line in some future cases not yet brought
seems wrong when the dangers and problems arising from the current system are so
manifest. It cannot be overemphasized that what is primarily at issue here is whether to
hand over a constitutional shield to commercial interests for speech contrary to the public
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interest. That corporate actions often are anti-democratic or in some conflict with
democratic principles seems undeniable.188
B. Content Discrimination
Some observers argue that the suggestion that promotional speech is entitled to
less First Amendment protection than political or expressive speech is inappropriate
content discrimination. To some extent the content discrimination objection is really an
argument that the Court in Virginia Pharmacy should have recognized the speech at issue
as completely protected, rather than setting up a secondary status for commercial speech.
But couched in terms of content discrimination it elides the fact that prior to Virginia
Pharmacy (and indeed to a large extent afterwards) this was acceptable content
discrimination. Promotional (or commercial) speech was simply not thought to be
covered by the First Amendment at all in much the same way that restraints on speech
imposed by an entity other than the government, for instance by an employer, were
similarly not seen as triggering First Amendment scrutiny. So if it is not covered, it
seems difficult to say that by extending limited protection you are engaging in content
discrimination. By its terms the amendment acts as a restraint on government. Even
within the framework of the restraint on government exceptions were made for certain
types of speech, libel, obscenity, sedition, treason, etc. Virginia Pharmacy had the effect
of extending limited First Amendment protection to a previously uncovered content
category – commercial speech. So we must undertake the question of the permissibility
of content discrimination from the standpoint that the existing law permits content
discrimination in this area. Commercial speech is defined by its content. So the question
is not whether we shall initiate content discrimination, but whether content discrimination
of this type is rational and should be extended, modified or abolished.
The Virginia Pharmacy Court began from the premise that commercial speech is
less valuable to the values the First Amendment was intended to protect than other types
of speech that were protected by the Amendment. But it concluded that this did not mean
that it was of no value. Even though as was noted in other contexts, the Constitution does
not require subscription to any particular economic theory, the Court found there was
some social benefit to be derived from not unduly restricting speech in the commercial
context. The Court found some value, coupled with a keen public interest, in certain
types of commercial speech – in truthful commercial speech. This distinguishes this
speech from expressive speech protected not because of its content or who the speaker is
but because its existence furthers human freedom. And commercial speech by
corporations offered to further its interests in the marketplace is very different from that
of an organization of persons, such as the ACLU, formed for the purpose of political
participation.
Just as is so often recited in other contexts, false speech has never been protected
for its own sake. The question is whether there is some countervailing reason to protect
the false speech. In the political context, as the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan
See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Markets & Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law, 74 UMKC L.
REV. 41 (2005).
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noted, protection for even false statements in the political context allows for vigorous
debate, the airing of all views, etc. It furthers individual’s self-expression and protects
the expression of dissident viewpoints. But value does false commercial speech protect?
Arguably none. False commercial speech may give the speaker a commercial advantage,
but it is not one that it is socially desirable to extend. And when the speaker is a forprofit corporation there is no expressive interest to be protected either.
Finally, although I my arguments here, taken at their strongest suggest abrogation
of the commercial speech doctrine and of Bellotti and its progeny altogether, that is not
this article’s principal target. Rather, its principal aim is to generate agreement that, if
nothing else, freedom for commercial expression should not be expanded beyond the
current doctrine and that the current doctrine ought to be interpreted more capaciously to
include all for-profit motivated, promotional speech that takes place under the umbrella
of marketing. Let it be left to the facts of the particular case whether some speech is
primarily “marketing” or not. Presumably, in the process of hearing such cases, facts
heretofore not considered can be analyzed with an eye to whether or not they fit primarily
in the marketing or primarily in the political speech category and the outlines of the
doctrine further sketched out. This is the way a common law system works.
Conclusion
Corporations (or large business interests) have greater and more subtle influences
on our lives than the governments under which we live. They influence what we think is
attractive in a mate, what we think our weddings should look like, how we feel about
ourselves given our looks and possessions. They frame some of our most urgent desires
and tell us what we ought to think is important. They may even have a role in
manipulating war and peace and political candidacies. They accumulate massive amounts
of wealth and wield substantial influence with governments in a way that few individuals
or any political coalition would ever hope to do. Their access to means of
communicating their message affect our ability to understand the issues, frame them or
make choices. And the frames that they supply often affect our health, the environment,
our peace of mind and the values of our children. All of this and yet they want more.
They want to use the metaphor of corporate personhood to shield them further from the
costs of these activities. That is an outrageous request. Yet they have succeeded in
framing the debate. It is time to reframe it.
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